Executive Summary
The Counter Insurgency (COIN) fight and asymmetric warfare in general, have become the new norm in modem warfare. As the U.S. military adapts to this everevolving fight, a shortfall has developed in Close Air Support (CAS) delivery. Modem U.S. ·fighters bring a terrific punch to the battlefield, but their limited on-station time and high attack velocities make them a poor fit for complex CAS delivery in the COIN fight.
Attack helicopters are formidable platforms, but their slow speeds make for long transit times to and from the fight. The advantages offered by these turboprops are tremendous. It adds up to very capable aircraft that bridges the performance gap between rotor and fixed wing aircraft, and it does so economically.
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The USMC has developed a CAS doctrine over the last several decades that is unequalled by any other service in any country. While some services view CAS as a secondary mission at best, USMC pilots train to support the infantry as THE mission from day one. From the early developmental stages of CAS techniques in WWII through the current Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support JP 3-09.3, the Marine Corps has been at the cutting edge of employment and development The evolution of warfare over the last two decades has shown a greatly increased CAS sortie rate across all ofthe services.
l The recent evolution ofthe COIN fight has only accelerated this increase. The increased prominence ofthe CAS mission has spurred greater efforts from the USMC to develop better tactics techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and a re-evaluation of CAS mission prominence by other services. The inability for the slower turboprops to conduct the entire mission set, from air to air and air to ground, has led to zero funding dollars for a dedicated COIN aircraft and to the adapting ofjets to the COIN fight. Department of Defense logic has been to fund multirole aircraft. "Speed is life" is a sound tenet beaten into the heads of fighter pilots everywhere and it certainly holds true in the Air Combat Maneuvering (ACM) realm.
Unfortunately, the development of ever faster aircraft has led to poor performance and efficiency at lower airspeeds. Avionics-The Texan also has an partial glass cockpit that is highly functional and upgradeable. The cockpit features OPS Navigation, provisions for a Heads Up Display, six Color Multi-Function Displays, and an integrated CommlNav suite. Hawker Beech also reports that more advanced avionics, a datalink system, and a FLIR system and Aircraft Survivability Equipment are all systems easily incorporated into the airframe.
Armament/Survivability-Although the T-6 only flies as a trainer in the U.S., the Hellenic Air Force flIes the T::oA as a pnmary andaovanced traiiief:-Thefrrsf 2S-ordered-are------straight leg trainers, but the follow on aircraft will have six hardpoints exposed for give it serious consideration, several major obstacles must be tackled. First, the Bell 609 is a side-by-side seat configuration. A tandem seat configuration is a better design as it offers a much greater visibility in the objective area. Second, the large protors on tiltrotor aircraft present a unique weapons delivery challenge. The strength ofhelicopter gunships is their ability to deliver off-axis fires-a strength any successful tiltrotor gunship would have to duplicate. The range of movement presented by the tilting engmes andlheoroad protor arc creates a cffiillengmg weapons traverse pro15lem.
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Finally, tiltrotor technology is very expensive. This base cost does not take into account 10 Scott, R.c.
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the weaponization ofthe model. lbis process would undoubtedly make the machine much more expensive.
Arguments Against
Fighting the Last War?
The platforms explored here are slower platforms that will perform well in the medium to low threat environment. Many will say that a program creation for this niche is "fighting the last war," in reference to the low threat "unconventional" environments lost. During the same period over SVN, 49 Skyraiders were lost. 16 Although this seems an almost acceptable ratio considering the higher threat ofNVN, the comparison does not take into account that 12071 more sorties were flown in SVN during the same timeframe. 17 The greater number of sorties flown in SVN did not produce a proportional increase in losses. A better picture develops when looking at combat losses per 1000 sorties. Over NVN the Skyraider lost 2.5 aircraft per 1000 sorties. Over SVN, this ratio fell to 1.1. Ofnote, the mission set in NVN was different than SVN. The NVN missions were pnmanlyDeep AlI Support (DKSy.--Tlie SVN mISSIOnS were mucli more vaneCl;ou included both DAS and CAS. Not surprisingly the higher threat presented by the North 12.
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produced twice as many losses as the lower threat South. This offers a sound argument for propeller driven aircraft operating primarily in low-threat environments.
Perhaps even more interesting is a comparison ofthe A-I vs. some of the newer jet powered attack aircraft ofthe Viet-Nam era. The two types of aircraft operated side by side in both the high threat of the North and the lower threat of the South. As mentioned above, the Skyraider lost 2.5 aircraft per 1000 sorties over NVN and 1.1 aircraft per 1000 sorties over SVN. During the same timeframe, the A-7 loss ratio was 1.5 and 0.2 respectively. The F-I05 was 3.3 and 0.3. The A-4 was 1.7 and 0.3. Thus, the Skyraider did have a slightly higher loss ratio when compared to the faster, more modem aircraft. However, the Skyraider was developed during WWII, fully a decade prior to the A-4, A-7, and F-104, and it did not enjoy much of the modem survivability equipment, system redundancies, and technologies that were available on the newer aircraft.
Finally, the argument that speed and maneuverability are paramount to survival loses some momentum considering that AH-ls, UH-ls, and AH-64s are effectively fighting and surviving in the same environment as their fixed-wing cousins and doing it between 100-150kts. The turboprop airplanes explored here will have a much larger operating envelope than their helicopter counterparts. Turboprop aircraft are able to quickly transit to the battlefield at 275 kts, loiter overhead to develop their situational awareness, and then increase their airspeeds to satisfy attack profiles. At the writing of this article, the cost was approaching $50 million/copy due to an AirForce reduction in number of aircraft ordered.
I9 These staggering costs appear much
Tecano is the bargain basement airplane coming in at a cost of $1.9 million per copy. As Warthog has a ratio of 14.03, the F-15E has a ratio of22.75, and the F-16C has a ratio of 17.75. 22 Clearly the turboprop aircraft is cheaper and easier to operate by orders of magnitude.
Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
The cost effective turboprops bring another benefit to the modem battlefield:
another very capable Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (lSR) platform. At a time when battlefield commanders cannot get enough ISR support, each one of our proposed turboprops would come with an impressive array of sensors, ready to tie into modem network-centric battlefields. In fact, in an effort to ease the ISR demand in U.S. combat theatres, the Air Force is configuring a fleet of37 C-12 Huron Turboprop aircraft as ISR platforms.
23 Among the arguments for fielding the C-12s cited by USAF BGen Blair E. Hansen was their " ...low footprint when it comes to ramp space on a flightline, but aISOlliey're easy to mamtain and operate." So, despIte Aft Force reSIstance to lowtech solutions, it appears they are already moving that direction out ofnecessity.
Although the turboprop CAS platforms do not have the endurance ofmany ofthe UAVs currently fielded, they offset this shortcoming by having a pilot on-scene with a highly developed situational awareness, ordnance onboard, and the ability to direct the fight.
Further, the turboprops will have longer endurance than any ofthe manned CAS platforms currently fielded.
Simplicity and Durability
The Super Tecano and the Texan II are powered by variants ofthe mighty PT-6 engine, built by Pratt and Whitney. It is the most prolific turboprop engine in history; it is used in over 65 current applications and over 36,000 units have been produced flying a staggering 300 million flying hours. 24 The US military is very familiar with the powerplant, as it has several aircraft that currently use various models. Suffice it to say, that the PT-6 engine is proven and dependable, and it comes with a well-established checks back in after a tanker plug, the ground situation changes, requiring a timely update to the friendly and enemy situation. The need to receive this update and to assimilate it burns into precious on-station time.
V-22 Escort
Finally, the MV-22 is proving itselfto be a worthy addition to the USMC fleet of aircraft. Several Iraq combat tours have let to the gradual expansion of its combat envelope. However, this unique aircraft is too fast for helicopter escort and too slow for high performance jet aircraft escort. There are "work-arounds" to escort the tiltrotor MV-22, but they are all less than optimal. Here is another opportunity for a turboprop.
Conclusions
This paper is not an indictment ofthe fixecl wing or the rotary wing communities.
Pilots in these communities do an outstanding job every day protecting Marines and soldiers on the ground. This proposal is a call to exploit a gap in the attack environment; a modem warfare niche that can be filled adequately and inexpensively with a turboprop /aircraft. Accepted logic dictates that a faster aircraft is more survivable and it is true to a certain extent; here it is argued that a slower aircraft offsets the velocity advantage with pilot situational awareness, cost, and loiter time. As the long time leader in CAS innovation, the USMC is the recognized authority in delivering close fires. In the Long War COIN fight Marines should not hesitate to suggest a cost effective solution if it will improve service to the Marine on the ground.:.-even ifthat suggestion goes against accepted logic. A turboprop aircraft is survivable, it has significant endurance, it carries maintained. The warriors ofthe Long War deserve nothing less. Type 2 control will be used when the JTAC desires control of individual attacks but assesses that either visual acquisition ofthe attacking aircraft or target at weapons release is not possible or when attacking aircraft are not in a position to acquire the mark/target prior to weapons release/ launch. Type 3 control may be used when the tactical risk assessment indicates that CAS attack imposes low risk offratricide.
